"We need to find some workable formula or solution, which is different from what we have so long been accustomed to." said Wansai at the meeting on Isolation or Engagement: Can the EU and Asia agree on how to treat Burma? (boxun.com)

He thought that neither isolation nor engagement approach tended to be effective when applied separately. To achieve maximum results, he urged, both approaches should be used in tandem.

He suggested a 4-point proposal:

Creation of a joint EU-Asean Task Force on Burma

Adoption of a benchmark policy of carrot and stick

Consideration of a 'consensus minus one' or 'Ten minus one' approach

Application of power mediation, also known as coercive diplomacy

Coming back from Brussels , Wansai remarked that the meeting was satisfactory, although he expressed disappointment with some of the non-governmental organizations. "It is quite depressing to see some NGOs acting like governments in power," he told S.H.A.N., "defending and excusing what EU has decided. No one was trying to break new ground but rather apologetic, I must say."

The European Union had on 14 September agreed to allow Burma's participation at the 8-9 October Asian-Europe summit meeting in Hanoi below the level of head of state or government, a position criticized by some Members of the European Parliament as a dangerous signal to the regime. The EU ministers countered by pointing out that they had also agreed to tighten sanctions against the regime if Aung San Suu Kyi is not released by 8 October.

The European Policy Center (EPC) is a think-tank made up of companies, professional and business federations trade unions, diplomatic missions, regional and local bodies as well as NGOs. "With lots of big international corporate members, the EPC is quite pro-business," observed Wansai.

Sai Wansai's speech is as follows:

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

On behalf of Shan Democratic Union, the people of Shan State and as an extension, the non-Burman ethnic nationalities of Burma, I am very honoured to be invited to this dialogue forum and would like to thank the FES and European Policy Centre for this opportunity to express our point of view.

My purpose here is to suggest what EU could do together with ASEAN in relation to the current political atmosphere prevailing in ASEM as a whole.

All of us are aware that the relationship between the two blocs, EU & ASEAN, has been in a tailspin, since EU has cancelled two ASEM finance and economy ministers meeting, due to the disagreement of Burma¡¯s participation, in July and September 2004.

It is also clear that the Burmese military junta, also known as State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), is a liability, rather than an asset, in resolving the problem surrounding EU-ASEAN relationship, not to mention the internal conflict raging within Burma for over four decades now.

Resolving EU-ASEAN relationship and internal conflict resolution in Burma are two sides of the same coin and needs to be tackled together, not separately.

If this is so, we need to find some workable formula or solution, which is different from what we have so long been accustomed to.

But first, let us look at briefly on what so far has been achieved by the ASEAN for admitting Burma in 1997.

The objective then was to woo Burma away from Chinese orbit, reform its economy and coax the junta to become more reasonable in resolving the problems, such as drugs, HIV/Aids, refugee and unofficial mass migration.

To make it short, these objectives have failed to bring desired results. Instead, Burma proved to be unreliable as ever, becoming more dependent on China militarily and economically, heightened worsening drugs trafficking, spread of HIV/Aids and the swelling refugee and IDP populations, with no end in sight. These spillover effects to neighbouring countries heated up the relation so bad, especially with Thailand, that the two countries have even gone to war with each other on two occasions.

To top this, Burma is going to chair ASEM in 2006 and one could imagine the catastrophic situation of what could happen, if EU and US refuse to participate.

This being the case, we would need to ponder on some way out, if we don¡¯t want to be stuck up in such an unpleasant situation.

To do this, we would need to change our approach to Burma¡¯s problem and look at it from a critical point of view.

In short, the EU should refuse to play along this SPDC¡¯s game of on and off ¡°arresting and releasing¡± of politicians, ¡°loosening and tightening¡± of political parties¡¯ movement, which are but only its ¡°one step forward, two steps backward¡± stalling strategy. Democratisation and reconciliation are not in its agenda.

To counter the SPDC, the EU and U.S. would need to come up with a set of new game plan so that it would be ill equipped to dictate or manipulate.

¡¤ First, the most important basic theoretical underpinnings, that Burma is on the verge of becoming of a ¡°failed state¡±, would have to be accepted by all parties concerned and that this is not in the interest of ASEAN, regional, interregional and international stakeholders.

¡¤ Second, the EU and U.S., with the backing of U.N., should earnestly advocate, win over the hearts and minds of those concerned to accept this conceptual thinking, of Burma edging towards failed state scenario, and work closely with the ASEAN, China, India and Japan partners; so that real reconciliation and democratisation take place, according to the UN resolution, to resolve the conflict in Burma. Based on this premises, a joint ¡°EU-ASEAN task force on Burma¡±, as called for by the Fifth EU-ASEAN Think-Tank Dialogue in Singapore in October 2003, could be created to tackle and resolve the issues surrounding the country.

¡¤ Third, if possible with the endorsement or mandate of UNGA and UNSC, a strategy, which combined the pressures on the military junta and engagement with the oppressed people, should be devised to have effective impact on implementing the UN resolution. In addition, pressures and sanctions should be coupled with benchmarks policy of ¡°carrot and stick¡± to create incentive for the SPDC.

¡¤ Fourth, if all the applied options are not fruitful, ¡°consensus minus one¡± or ¡°ten minus one¡± approach should be considered as a last resort for the benefit of EU-ASEAN relationship by both blocs.

¡¤ Last but not least, if somehow the international community is able to correct the balance of power between the SPDC on one side and the NLD and non-Burman ethnic nationalities on the other, ¡°power mediation¡± or ¡°coercive diplomacy¡± could be applied to facilitate long-lasting solution to the problems of Burma.

In concrete terms, it would mean that the UN endorsement of rescue plan for the oppressed people of Burma to bring democratic change, provide security, reduce poverty, rebuild civil society and facilitate capacity-building. At the same time, appropriate pressures and sanctions coupled with benchmarks policy should be applied on the SPDC.

Al though the recent ICG report ¡°Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas¡± has pointed out the international community should work together with the ¡°ceasefire armies¡± in their controlled areas, the best place to start would be along the Thai-Burma border, where the bulk of the one million IDP populations ¨C over 600,000 ¨C are located and considered to be the militarised or contested zones between the SPDC regime and ethnic resistance forces.

This would need large-scale cooperation and coordination from the Thai government and could only be worked out once Thailand sees this undertaking beneficial to all concerned in the long run. Consequently, this type of cross border or direct intervention could only be carried out with the endorsement of U.N. and in collaboration with the resistance forces which control the strip along Thai-Burma border, such as the SSA (South), KNPP and KNU. This would also mean, territorial integrity and non-intervention norms would have to take a back seat, in favour of humanitarian intervention.

If this supposition would become a reality, a row of other humanitarian devices and aids could be carried out across the border, without having to deal with the SPDC. In other words, the international community could bypass the SPDC regime to help the badly needed oppressed population along the border. After this it is, of course, not too far-fetched to create ¡°safe havens, sanctuaries of peace, peace corridors, health as a bridge for peace¡± initiatives and many others.

The point here is to insert international community¡¯s authority in the contested zones, which the SPDC considered ¡°grey areas¡± or hostile territories against its rule, and give back human security and dignity to the people of the border areas, whose human rights have been violated over and over again by the military regime.

If this scenario, however remote it might seem for now, would become applicable, the SPDC¡¯s hold on power could be eroded faster than we ever expected. Just imagine, the UNSC endorsed sanctions coupled with such cross-border humanitarian relieve operations could do to the entrenched military dictatorship.

Finally, I believe, if the influential international stakeholders are prepared to go beyond the recent symbolic sanctions and periodical resolutions and condemnations, and come up with practical solutions, somewhat similar along the line of above mentioned approaches, we would be able to witness a new dawn in Burma and perhaps pave way for a more harmonious relationship between the EU and ASEAN.

Thank you.

Published by Burma Chinese (boxun.com)